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Gulf Hypoxia

Hypoxia in the Gulf of Mexico:
A Legal and Practical Analysis.
“[Over the past century] overfishing was the leading environmental issue affecting
our seas. In the new millennium, it's going to be oxygen."
- Robert J. Diaz, Virginia Institute of Marine Sciences1

Each year, a large area of the Gulf of Mexico is seasonally depleted of life-giving
oxygen. Called hypoxia, the phenomenon threatens to bring about a collapse of the Gulf’s marine
ecosystem,2 harming commercial fisheries with an annual economic worth estimated at $2.8
billion.3 The Mississippi River/Gulf of Mexico Watershed Nutrient Task Force is a voluntary
regime formed to address this and other threats to the Gulf of Mexico and is comprised of
federal, state, and tribal representatives.4 The Task Force has set a year 2015 goal of
considerably reducing the size of the Gulf hypoxic area to less than 5,000 square kilometers by
2015.5 Implementation of this goal will entail an estimated reduction in nitrogen loading to the
Gulf of at least thirty percent.6
This note analyzes the conceptual transformation of this voluntary regime into a
regulatory one. Such a regulatory regime would be based on the development of federal “Total
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Janet Raloff, Dead Waters: Massive oxygen-starved zones are developing along the world's coasts, 165 SCI. NEWS
360 (2004), available at http://www.sciencenews.org/articles/20040605/bob9.asp.
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See Id.
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US NATIONAL SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY COUNCIL, COMMITTEE ON ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES,
An Integrated Assessment of Hypoxia in the Northern Gulf of Mexico, May, 2000, at 7. [hereinafter, INTEGRATED
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See Mississippi River/Gulf of Mexico Watershed Nutrient Task Force web page at
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Maximum Daily Loads” (TMDLs or “pollution budgets”) for the parameters of nitrogen and
phosphorus under the framework established by section 303(d) of the Clean Water Act,7 and
implementation of nutrient reductions through a pollution trading program. Because the CWA
only permits regulation of “point sources” of pollution, a term that specifically exempts
agricultural run-off,8 the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) could not implement a
Mississippi River Basin nutrient TMDL through direct federal regulation of agricultural nonpoint sources of pollution. 9 However, a TMDL-based, regulatory regime for the Mississippi
River watershed, implemented through a pollution trading program, would give state and federal
agencies leverage to effectively “bargain” for non-point source reductions.10
This note analyzes the Clean Water Act (CWA or “the Act”) and finds that the statute
itself does not expressly answer the question of the extent to which the EPA may regulate
upstream point sources of pollution that degrade federal ocean waters beyond the “territorial
seas” - a term defined in the statute as a “belt of the seas... extending seaward [from shore] a
distance of three miles.”11 Nonetheless, it concludes that the most reasonable reading is that the
statute does confer to the EPA discretionary authority under the Act to develop and implement a
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See 33 U.S.C. § 1313(d) (2000). See also text accompanying notes 109 to 112.
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The CWA defines a “point source” as any “discernible, confined and discrete conveyance, including but not
limited to any pipe, ditch, channel, tunnel, conduit, well, discrete fissure, container, rolling stock, concentrated
animal feeding operation, or vessel or other floating craft, from which pollutants are or may be discharged. This
term does not include agricultural stormwater discharges and return flows from irrigated agriculture.” 33 U.S.C. §
1362(14) (2000).
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See Pronsolino v. Nastri, 291 F.3d 1123 (9th Cir. 2002) (discussing the lack of a mandate in the CWA for the
implementation of TMDLs through reduction of nonpoint sources of pollution).
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See William F. Pederson, Using Federal Environmental Regulations to Bargain for Private Land Use Control, 21
YALE J. on REG. 1 (2004) (Discussing the value of the federal government replacing regulations with “bargaining
entitlements” which can be used to negotiate with private parties to influence land use in order to achieve
environmental improvement.)
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See 33 U.S.C. § 1362(8) (2000).
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regulatory regime to restore those waters of the Gulf of Mexico beyond the territorial seas.
Furthermore, it concludes that the broad mandate of section 301(b)(1)(C) of the Act,12
considered in conjunction with the requirements of the Endangered Species Act13 and the
Magnuson Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act,14 reinforces this conclusion.
Nonetheless, it recommends that Congress amend the Clean Water Act, expressly delegating
authority to the EPA to provide for the stewardship of the quality of U.S. ocean waters, and
revising the Act’s marine jurisdictional lines in order to make them consistent with general U.S.
jurisdiction over adjacent marine waters. This note then considers whether, as a practical matter,
a regulatory regime is preferable to a voluntary one. It concludes that a regulatory regime is
indeed preferable, particularly if a pollution-trading framework is used to grant regulated entities
some flexibility and to permit the regime to attain the most cost-effective reductions through a
combination of point source and non-point source reductions.
This note is divided into the following sections. Part IA discusses the phenomenon of
hypoxia generally. Part IB gives an overview of hypoxia in the Gulf of Mexico. Part IC discusses
the existing regime to control Gulf hypoxia, briefly outlining the contours of a proposed
regulatory regime. Part ID outlines five elements of Gulf hypoxia that make both legal and
practical analysis of the problem particularly challenging. Part IIA considers the EPA’s authority
to regulate Gulf pollution under the Clean Water Act. Part IIB argues that the Magnuson-Stevens
Fishery Conservation and Management Act and the Endangered Species Act, when read in light
of section 301(b)(1)(c) of the Clean Water Act, confer additional responsibilities upon the

12

33 U.S.C. § 1311(b)(1)(C) (2000).

13

16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1543 (2000).
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16 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1883 (2000).
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Administrator of EPA with respect to Gulf hypoxia. Part IIC considers two potential
opportunities to interject into Congressional debate consideration of the value of amending the
Clean Water Act. The two specific opportunities discussed are Congressional consideration of
the ratification of UNCLOS) and the proposed “Clean Water Authority Restoration Act of
2005.” Part III engages in a practical analysis regarding development and implementation of an
enforceable pollution control regime for the Gulf. Finally, Part IV concludes with recommended
actions to reverse the trend of a growing hypoxic area in the Gulf of Mexico.

I. An Overview of Gulf Hypoxia
A. The Phenomenon of Hypoxia
In a fine example of “too much of a good thing,” nutrient over-enrichment is starving
marine waters across the globe of life-giving oxygen.15 While minor increases in nutrient levels
generally correlate with increased productivity in aquatic ecosystems,16 excessive nutrient inputs
initiate a biological chain reaction called eutrophication. Eutrophication entails multiple aquatic
ecosystem responses, often including decreased dissolved oxygen concentrations.17 Average
dissolved oxygen concentrations of approximately 5 milligrams per liter (mg/l) are generally
required to support healthy aquatic ecosystems.18 Low dissolved oxygen conditions are referred

15

See Robert J. Diaz, Overview of Hypoxia Around the World, 30 J. ENVIRON. QUAL. 275 (2001), available at
http://jeq.scijournals.org/cgi/reprint/30/2/275.

16

Id.at 276. However, it is important to note that even as increased nutrients may lead to increased productivity,
biodiversity of the affected system may be decreased through simplification of the food web. For more information
see the US EPA Eutrophication web site at http://www.epa.gov/maia/html/eutroph.html.

17

The chain reaction essentially works as follows: increased nutrient inputs result in the proliferation of algal
growths, which then sink into the heavier and more saline waters that are stratified below, robbing these waters of
oxygen as the plant biomass decays.

18

See, e.g., US ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY (EPA), NATIONAL RECOMMENDED WATER QUALITY
CRITERIA (2002) at 6 (“For many fish and shellfish, extended periods of D.O. below 5 mg/l can cause adverse
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to as hypoxia when levels drop below 2 mg/l. 19 Hypoxic waters are sufficiently depleted of
dissolved oxygen that most marine life cannot survive in them for more than short durations.20
Hypoxia tends to occur where anthropogenic nutrient inputs meet a stratified water column.21
Areas where large freshwater inflows meet relatively calm marine environments are susceptible
to hypoxia due to the level of stratification naturally occurring in these systems.22 While
increased levels of phosphorus (and, to a small extent, silica) can cause or contribute to hypoxic
conditions, nitrogen loading is usually the primary culprit. 23 These nutrients are being introduced
into aquatic ecosystems in increasing amounts through agricultural practices (especially the use
of synthetic fertilizers); increased discharges from municipal sewage treatment plants and septic
systems, industrial discharges, and other sources such as deposition from air pollutants – all of
which may be viewed as a function of human population growth.24

B. Hypoxia in the Gulf of Mexico

effects to larval stages.”), available at http://www.epa.gov/waterscience/pc/revcom.pdf; See also, US EPA,
AMBIENT WATER QUALITY CRITERIA FOR DISSOLVED OXYGEN (SALTWATER): CAPE COD TO CAPE HATTERAS (2000)
(defining multiple dissolved oxygen criteria, and generally finding that survival of juvenile and adult marine species
requires that D.O. levels not drop below 2.3 mg/L for 24 hours or more, and that prevention of adverse effects on
growth of adult and juvenile species requires that D.O. levels not drop below 4.8 mg/l for 24 hours or more.),
available at http://www.epa.gov/waterscience/standards/dissolved/docriteria.pdf The precise levels of oxygen
required to support healthy marine ecosystems is a matter that continues to be debated.
19

The related phenomenon of anoxia occurs when waters are completely devoid of oxygen.

20

See Diaz supra note 15, at 276.

21

Stratification occurs when warmer, less saline waters essentially float on top of denser, more saline waters.

22

See Diaz, supra note 15, at 276.

23

Id.

24

Id.
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In late spring of each year, an area of hypoxic water begins to form in the Gulf of
Mexico, expanding in size over the summer, and disappearing again in the fall.25 Because the
benthos and lower water column in the vast area affected by seasonal hypoxia are mostly devoid
of life during times when hypoxia is occurring, Gulf hypoxia is often popularly called “the dead
zone.”26 Gulf hypoxia was first documented in 1972.27 The aerial extent of hypoxia differs from
year to year, as a function of varying nutrient levels and freshwater inflows into the Gulf in the
spring and summer months, but the clear trend has been an increase over time.28 The spatial
extent of Gulf hypoxia more than doubled in size after the Mississippi River flood of 1993,
covering an area of over 18,000 km², and remaining about that size each year through
midsummer 1997.29 In 1999 the Gulf hypoxic area covered about 20,000 km² (about 8,000
square miles);30 and in 2002 it reached its maximum extent of about 22,000 km² - an area larger
than the state of Massachusetts.31 Gulf hypoxia occurs primarily off the shores of Louisiana,

25

See Nancy N. Rabalais et al., Hypoxia in the Gulf of Mexico 30 J. ENVIRON. QUAL. 320, 321 (2001).

26

This term is more appealing than “hypoxia” because it articulates the seriousness of the problem in common
language. However, the term is somewhat misleading for at least three reasons. First, it implies a fixed area;
however, the aerial extent of Gulf hypoxia varies dramatically both intra and inter-annually. Second, unlike in some
other areas of the world where hypoxia occurs, the phenomenon in the Gulf is seasonal. During much of the year
fish and aquatic life are able to make use of the areas which experience Gulf hypoxia. As hypoxia begins to occur,
more mobile species are able to escape hypoxic waters, while populations of less mobile species perish. However,
even these less mobile species are able to seasonally re-colonize benthic habits, at least to some extent, as oxygen
levels again rise in the seasonally affected areas. See, e.g., US NATIONAL SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY COUNCIL,
COMMITTEE ON ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES, An Integrated Assessment of Hypoxia in the Northern
Gulf of Mexico, May, 2000, at 31. Thus, the Gulf hypoxic area is not truly a “dead zone;” rather, it is a complex,
variable ecosystem response to increased nutrient loading.
27

See Rabalais, supra note 25, at 321.

28

See Id.

29

See NOAA, National Centers for Coastal Ocean Science, Gulf of Mexico Hypoxia Assessment web page at
http://www.nos.noaa.gov/products/pubs_hypox.html#Intro.

30

See ACTION PLAN supra note 5.

31

See USGS, Gulf of Mexico Hypoxic Zone web site at http://toxics.usgs.gov/hypoxia/hypoxic_zone.html.
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though some years it extends west to the coast of Texas. The hypoxic waters extend from near
shore environments seaward to between 55 and 130 km from shore.32 Also, when the Mississippi
River’s flow is high and summer currents distribute more of its nutrient-laden waters to the east,
related (but distinct) areas of hypoxia may appear in bathymetric lows off the coast of
Alabama.33 There is considerable debate regarding the extent to which increased nutrient levels
are effectively the sole cause of Gulf hypoxia, or whether hydrological alteration or other factors
are significant.34 However, it is clear, at least, that nutrient pollution is the primary cause of Gulf
hypoxia. A three-fold increase in the nitrogen load to the Gulf over the past three decades or so is
generally viewed as the primary culprit.35 However, phosphorus loading is also an important
factor,36 and a recent EPA Region 4 analysis suggests that phosphorus may indeed be more
important than previously believed, particularly in the eastern portion of the hypoxic area.37

32

See Rabalais, supra note 25, at 322. (Noting also that gulf hypoxia extends to about 55 km from shore where the
continental shelf slopes more steeply, and to about 130 km where the gradient is more gradual.) 55 km is equivalent
to about 29.6 nautical miles. 130 km is equivalent to about 70.2 nautical miles.

33

Id.

34

See, e.g., Nancy N. Rabalais, Hypoxia in the Gulf of Mexico, 12 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 321 (1999) (Arguing water
quality degradation as the cause and discounting importance of hydrologic modification); but see, the Fertilizer
Institute web site at www.tfi.org. (arguing that there are multiple causes, and thus nitrogen loading is not the sole
culprit).
35

See Donald Scavia, Nancy N. Rabalais et. al., Predicting the response of Gulf of Mexico hypoxia to variations in
Mississippi River nitrogen load, 48(3) LIMNOL. OCEANOGR. 951, 951 (2003).

36

See Rabalais, supra note 25, at 322.

37

See US ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, REGION 4, EVALUATION OF THE ROLE OF NITROGEN AND
PHOSPHORUS IN CAUSING OR CONTRIBUTING TO HYPOXIA IN THE NORTHERN GULF (August, 2004) (on file with
author), available at http://www.epa.gov/msbasin/region4report.htm. (calling for reductions in both nitrogen and
phosphorus loading as the proper strategy for reducing gulf hypoxia). See also U.S. EPA, Final Meeting Summary:
Eleventh Meeting of the Mississippi River/Gulf of Mexico Watershed Nutrient Task Force, September 1, 2004 at
https://www.epa.gov/msbasin/meet_summ11.pdf (Containing the following summary of the presentation of Mr. Jim
Giattina, EPA Region 4: “The eastern part of the hypoxia region of the Gulf is phosphorus limited and the western
zone is nitrogen limited, which suggests that a dual nitrogen and phosphorus reduction strategy would be
appropriate.”).
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C. The Current Voluntary Regime and a Concept for a Regulatory Regime.
Congress enacted the Harmful Algal Bloom and Hypoxia Research and Control Act on
November 13, 1998.38 The statute required the President to create an “Inter-Agency Task Force
on Harmful Algal Blooms and Hypoxia” and charged the Task Force with the duty to complete
an assessment of Gulf hypoxia and submit a report to Congress within twelve months.39
Pursuant to the statute, the Mississippi River/Gulf of Mexico Watershed Nutrient Task Force
convened for the first time in the fall of 1997.40 The Task Force submitted to Congress its Action
Plan for Reducing, Mitigating and Controlling Hypoxia in the Northern Gulf of Mexico on
January 18, 2001.41 The plan set the goal of reducing the five-year running average of the
overall size of the Gulf hypoxic area to less than 5,000 square kilometers by 2015.42 In order to
achieve this goal, the plan estimates that a 30% reduction in nitrogen discharges to the Gulf will
be necessary; however, more recent analyses conclude that even greater reductions may be
necessary.43 The plan calls for attainment of its goals through voluntary nutrient reduction
strategies and the use of existing regulatory programs.44 The task force is currently working with
the EPA Gulf of Mexico program and stakeholder groups to implement a regime that includes
monitoring Gulf of Mexico hypoxia and encouraging voluntary controls.

38

Public Law 105-383, 16 U.S.C. § 1451 note (2000).

39

Id.

40

See ACTION PLAN supra note 5, at 34.

41

Id.

42

Id. at 12.

43

Id. (The baseline for this targeted reduction is established using the average of nitrogen discharge from 1980 to
1996.) See also, Donald Scavia, supra note 35 (concluding that 30% reductions might not be sufficient, and that
nitrogen reductions between 35% and 45% may be necessary).
44

Id.
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As an alternative to this voluntary regime, a regulatory regime could be created under the
framework of the Clean Water Act’s Total Maximum Daily Load (TMDL) requirements.45 In
such a regime, the EPA would develop two TMDLs, one each for nitrogen and phosphorus.
Ideally, EPA would subsequently work with states to implement the requisite reductions through
a combination of oversight of state actions, including standards-setting and permitting, and
through the administration of a Mississippi River basin nutrient-trading program.46 A pollution
trading program would allocate required reductions among point sources, and then permit trading
among both point sources and non-point sources as an alternative means of achieving them.
In envisioning such a system, assume that a 30% reduction from point sources is feasible.
Given that point sources only comprise an estimated 10% of the nutrient problem, this would
only result in a 3% reduction in Gulf of Mexico nutrient loading. However, consider a system
where point sources could trade with nonpoint sources at a 10:1 ratio (for trading purposes, ten
units of nonpoint source reduction would be equal to 1 unit of point source reduction). Under
such a system, if we assume that nonpoint source reductions would be substantially less
expensive than point source reductions in most cases, then the 30% reduction target would nearly
be achieved. At least two conditions should be placed on such trades. First, the point source
would have to be able to continue to discharge without causing or contributing to a local
violation of water quality standards. Second, any trading with non-point sources would have to
include sufficient assurances that reductions would be achieved. Ideally, such trading agreements
should explicitly provide that any citizen with standing to sue the point source discharger itself
under the Clean Water Act would constitute an intended, third-party beneficiary of the
45

See 33 U.S.C. §1313(d) (2000).

46

See U.S. COMMISSION ON OCEAN POLICY, AN OCEAN BLUE PRINT FOR THE 21ST CENTURY, Washington, D.C.
(2004) at 495 (endorsing pollution trading as a strategy to reduce nutrients in ocean waters).
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contractual agreement through which the pollutant trade was conducted. Thus, if the non-point
source project were not implemented within a reasonable time, citizens could sue the point
source (and not the non-point source) both to enforce the contract and to correct a violation
pursuant to section 505 of the Act.47 However, as long as the non-point source reduction project
was faithfully implemented, the point source should not be vulnerable to suit, even if the
anticipated reductions were not actually achieved.
Such a federal, interstate TMDL would be unprecedented. While EPA has developed
interstate TMDLs in a few instances, including a TMDL for dioxin in the Columbia River Basin
restricting industrial discharges of the pollutant in Oregon, Washington and Idaho,48 an interstate
TMDL for the Mississippi River basin would far exceed any interstate TMDL effort undertaken
to date by the agency. Such a TMDL would cover thousands of pollution sources within
territories covering 31 states - or a land area constituting 41% of the continental United States. A
federal nutrient pollution trading framework for the Mississippi River basin would also be
unprecedented.49 Most, if not all, of the nutrient pollution trading programs to date have been
much smaller-scale and relatively ineffective.50 However, a Mississippi River basin trading
program, implemented on the federal level, might have a better chance at success than these

47

33 U.S.C. § 1365 (2000).

48

See, e.g., Dioxin/Organochlorine Center v. Clarke, 57 F.3d 1517 (9th Cir. 1995); See also EPA Region 4 TMDL
web site (containing information on the Coosa River Basin TMDL in Alabama and Georgia), at
http://www.epa.gov/region4/water/tmdl/alabama/#coosa; and EPA Region 3 TMDL web site (containing
information on a TMDL for the Christina Basin in Maryland, Pennsylvania, and Delaware), at
http://www.epa.gov/reg3wapd/christina/pdf/execsumm.pdf.

49

See Ann Powers, The Current Controversy Regarding TMDLs: Contemporary Perspectives, “TMDLs and
Pollutant Trading,” 4 RES COMMUNES: VT.’S J. ENV’T 2 (2002-2003) (Discussing various pollution trading
programs, including a useful appendix of “well-known water quality trading programs,” all of which could be
accurately described as relatively small-scale and ineffective in that little pollution trading has actually occurred
under the programs).
50

See Id.
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programs due to the size of the “market” for trades and coordination through a central
authority.51 Such a program could effectively give point sources a market incentive to identify
and implement cost-effective reductions in the agricultural non-point source loading that is
primarily responsible for Gulf hypoxia. Oversight of state- level implementation could
conceivably include allocation of total permissible loads to each state.52 States would be required
to modify their water quality standards and permitting practices accordingly to limit nutrient
discharges. Such a state-by-state system of setting nutrient standards based on both intrastate
conditions and interstate pollution concerns might be more palatable to EPA than federal
promulgation of uniform, basin-wide water quality standards for nutrients in all Mississippi
River basin states – a concept recently proposed to the EPA in a petition for rulemaking
submitted by the Ozark Chapter of the Sierra Club, and rejected by the agency in June 2004.53

D. The Five Practical and Legal Challenges Presented by Gulf Hypoxia
From both the standpoints of practical and legal analyses, hypoxia in the Gulf of Mexico
presents a mammoth environmental challenge. Five aspects of Gulf hypoxia make it uniquely
difficult to address. First, Gulf hypoxia is a challenge because the adverse impacts often occur in
locations far distant from the source of the pollutants. The nutrient pollution that causes the
problem is transported great distances through freshwater rivers, becoming disproportionately
51

One variable which could conceivably “shrink the market” for trades is found in the Farm Bill programs
allocating funding under programs such as the Conservation Reserve and Environmental Quality Incentives Program
(EQIP). If funding under these programs expanded considerably enough, there could conceivably be little demand
left for non-point source reduction projects on agricultural lands.

52

See text accompanying notes 109 to 112. Normally, states develop TMDLs and then implement point source
reductions through their permitting programs. However a federal, interstate TMDL would likely set limits for each
state and require the states to meet such reductions.
53

See EPA Response to Sierra Club Petition Regarding Defined Portions of the Mississippi and Missouri Rivers
(June, 2004) at http://www.epa.gov/waterscience/standards/sierra-supp.pdf.
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more biologically available to support primary production upon reaching the affected ocean
waters.54 Approximately 90% of the nitrate load transported to the Gulf is believed to stem from
sources upstream of the confluence of the Mississippi and Ohio Rivers.55 Because these states
are not directly adversely affected by Gulf hypoxia, they may have little incentive to incur the
costs associated both with administration of the regime and implementation of pollution
reductions.
Second, a myriad of point and non-point sources of nutrientsare the c ause of Gulf
hypoxia. As such, any one source is inevitably “insignificant” when viewed only as a single
source. While estimates vary, approximately ninety percent of the pollution load causing
hypoxia is believed to result from non-point sources. 56 The remainder is contributed by point
sources including an estimated 12,400 sewage treatment plants and 3,900 industrial nutrient
dischargers.57
Third, the adverse impacts to the Gulf ecosystem are hard to quantify for purposes of
cost/benefit analysis, making it difficult to determine the most “economically efficient” level of
investment in a pollution control regime. Brown shrimp yields, measured in terms of catch per
unit effort, have been trending down since the seventies; with the overall (dollar) yield also
trending down since a record high in 1990.58 Other than these trends for the shrimp fishery,

54

See Id. quoting and citing Alexander, R.B. et al. Effect of stream channel size on the delivery of nitrogen to the
Gulf of Mexico, NATURE 403 (2001) at 758-761 (concluding that over 90% of the nitrate that reaches the Mississippi
River is transported downstream to the Gulf of Mexico).
55

56

Id. See also, ACTION PLAN, supra note 5, at 8.
See INTEGRATED ASSESSMENT, supra note 3, at 3.

57

Mary L. Belefeski & Larinda Tervelt Norton, Hypoxia in the Gulf of Mexico: A Historical and Policy Perspective,
12 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 331, 349 (1999).

58

See US NATIONAL SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY COUNCIL, COMMITTEE ON ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL
RESOURCES, AN INTEGRATED ASSESSMENT OF HYPOXIA IN THE NORTHERN GULF OF MEXICO (2000) at 25.
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there is relatively little quantified evidence of adverse impacts to the Gulf fishing industry.59 The
most serious concern involves the risk of a “collapse” of the Gulf’s $2.8 billion fishery in the
future,60 such as has occurred in Eastern Europe’s Black Sea,61 and in the North Sea (separating
Norway, Denmark and Sweden) in 1979.62 Such an ecosystem collapse could occur as a result of
the synergistic effect of hypoxia and growing fishing pressure. For example, hypoxia can “herd”
commercial species into areas with higher oxygen levels along the edge of a hypoxic zone.63
Concentrated fishing efforts along this edge can thus produce large yields of seafood in the short
term, depleting fish stocks to dangerously low levels in the process. Obviously, a collapse of
Gulf of Mexico fisheries would be extremely hard to reverse.64
Fourth, science suggests that any reductions that are implemented today may not
consistently yield higher oxygen levels in the Gulf of Mexico for many years. There is often a
delay of a decade or more between the increased or decreased inputs of nitrogen fertilizers and
the ecological response of increased or decreased dissolved oxygen levels in coastal waters.65
This is, in part, due to the fact that many agricultural lands are “saturated” with nutrients from
past and ongoing fertilizer use.66

59

See Belefeski, supra Note 57, at 338.

60

See INTEGRATED ASSESSMENT, supra note 3, at 7.

61

Downing, J.A., J.L. Baker, R.J. Diaz, T. Prato, N.N. Rabalais, R.J. Zimmerman, GULF OF MEXICO HYPOXIA:
LAND AND SEA INTERACTIONS: COUNCIL FOR AGRICULTURAL SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY TASK FORCE REPORT
(1999).
62

See Raloff, supra note 1.

63

Id.

64

Id.; See also MARK MURLANSKY, COD: A BIOGRAPHY OF THE FISH THAT CHANGED THE WORLD (Penguin Books
1997) (discussing depletion of cod fish stocks and various successes and failures in restoring stocks over time).
65

Id.; See also Mark Clayton, Dead Zones Threaten Fisheries, THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, May 27, 2004.

66

See Belefeski, supra note 57, at 346.
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Fifth, and finally, Gulf hypoxia occurs primarily in waters that are more than three miles
seaward of the shoreline and thus beyond the reach of the “territorial seas” as defined by the
Clean Water Act.67 Thus, the problem waters are found mostly in an area of exclusively federal
jurisdiction, beggaring analysis under the “cooperative federalism” framework of the Clean
Water Act.68 The geographic location of Gulf hypoxia, together with the Clean Water Act’s
inconsistency with general U.S. jurisdiction over its marine waters, collectively raise difficult
questions regarding which CWA provisions apply to the affected waters.

II. A Legal Analysis of Gulf Hypoxia
A. The Clean Water Act
The over-arching goal of the Clean Water Act (CWA or the Act) is to “restore and
maintain the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the Nation’s waters.”69 The CWA
prohibits all point source discharges of pollution unless they are permitted pursuant to its
requirements.70 While the Act created a system of pollution controls that has often been
described as “comprehensive,”71 Gulf hypoxia has effectively eluded the Act’s carefully
constructed system of regulatory controls.

67

While the Clean Water Act just uses the term “mile” - a distance which, when used to refer to distances on land,
refers to a distance equal to 1.609 kilometers, this note assumes that the term “mile” as used in the Act means
“nautical mile.” A “nautical mile” – also called a “geographic mile” – is a distance which is equal to 1.852
kilometers. See RANDOM HOUSE COLLEGE DICTIONARY, REVISED EDITION (1988). Likewise, whenever this note
uses the term mile, the term “nautical mile” is intended.

68

33 U.S.C. §§ 1291-1386 (2000).

69

33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (2000).

70

33 U.S.C. § 1311(a) (2000).

71

See Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 531 U.S. 159, 179 (2001)
(Stevens, J. dissenting). (“The shift in the focus of federal water regulation from protecting navigability toward
environmental protection reached a dramatic climax in 1972, with the passage of the CWA. The Act, which was
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In order to effectively harness the CWA’s regulatory provisions to reach the upstream
sources of pollution that impair the Gulf, the following steps are required. First, some ambient
standards must apply to the affected waters that can be invoked to require regulation of upstream
sources. Second, hypoxia must constitute a violation of the applicable ambient standards. Third,
a Total Maximum Daily Load (TMDL) - or other mechanism for creating a “pollution budget” must quantify upstream loads and prescribe necessary reductions. Fourth, the TMDL (or other
mechanism) must be implemented to reduce pollution from distant upstream sources.
The first step in this analysis is to ascertain which, if any, ambient standards apply to the
affected Gulf of Mexico waters, and to determine whether any such applicable standards may
form the legal basis for a regulatory pollution control regime. The Act creates four systems of
often overlapping standards, which may be applicable in limiting point source discharges
through one of two permitting systems: the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System
(NPDES) created by section 402,72 or the “dredged or fill material” permitting program created
by section 404.73 The primary ambient standards in the Act are the water quality standards of
section 303.74 In addition, the Act contains ocean discharge criteria (section 403(c))75 and

passed as an amendment to the existing FWPCA, was universally described by its supporters as the first truly
comprehensive federal water pollution legislation. The ‘major purpose’ of the CWA was ‘to establish a
comprehensive long-range policy for the elimination of water pollution.’ S.Rep. No. 92-414, p. 95 (1971), 2
Legislative History of the Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972 (Committee Print compiled for the
Senate Committee on Public Works by the Library of Congress), Ser. No. 93-1, p. 1511 (1971)(emphasis added).
And ‘[n]o Congressman's remarks on the legislation were complete without reference to [its] 'comprehensive' nature
...." Milwaukee v. Illinois [citation omitted].”)
72

33 U.S.C. § 1342 (2000).

73

33 U.S.C. § 1344 (2000).

74

33 U.S.C. § 1313 (2000).

75

33 U.S.C. § 1343 (2000).
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guidelines for the discharge of dredge or fill material (section 404(b)(1)).76 These section
404(b)(1) guidelines are clearly only applicable to “section 404” permits, and thus cannot be
harnessed to reach upstream and regulate distant sources of pollution.77 Finally, the Act contains
technology-based effluent limits (sections 301, 304(b) and 306) which are established for
dischargers without consideration of ambient water quality.78 Thus, the section 303 water quality
standards and the section 403 ocean discharge criteria comprise the two sets of standards in the
Act that could form the basis for regulatory controls of NPDES
- permitted discharges upstream.

The question of court deference to agency interpretations of statutes: the Chevron analysis.
The analyses of EPA authority under sections 303 and 403 of the Clean Water Act must
proceed pursuant to the analytical framework created by the Supreme Court in Chevron U.S.A. v.
Natural Resources Defense Council. 79 In Chevron, the Court set out a two-step analytical process
that applies when a court reviews an agency interpretation of a “statute which it administers.”80
This “Chevron two- step” is to proceed as follows:
First, always, is the question whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise
question at issue. If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter; for
the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed
intent of Congress. If, however, the court determines Congress has not directly
76

33 U.S.C. § 1344(b)(1) (2000).

77

See 33 C.F.R. § 320.4 (containing the US EPA’s 404(b)(1) guidelines). These guidelines are clearly focused on
the criteria to be used to guide individual permitting decisions. Because the subsection 404(b)(1) guidelines are
applicable only to the issuance of “Section 404” permits, and do not set quality standards for ambient waters, these
guidelines may not be used to control 402 discharges. However, section 404 permitted discharges are not to cause or
contribute to water quality standards violations, though state certification of a project under section 401 of the CWA
is considered conclusive on this matter. See 33 C.F.R. § 320.4(d), See also Friends of the Earth v. Hintz, 800 F.2d
822, 834 (9th Cir. 1986).
78

33 U.S.C. §§ 1311(a), 1314(b), 1316 (2000).

79

Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984).

80

Id. at 842.
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addressed the precise question at issue, the court does not simply impose its own
construction on the statute, as would be necessary in the absence of an
administrative interpretation. Rather, if the statute is silent or ambiguous with
respect to the specific issue, the question for the court is whether the agency's
answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute.”81
If the Congress did not speak to the precise question at issue, the delegation to the agency may
be either explicit or implicit: in either case, a court is to extend deference to the agency
interpretation as long as it is a reasonable one.82

The Ocean Discharge Criteria of section 403.
Section 403(a) states “no discharge under section 1342 [§ 402] of this title for a
discharge into the territorial sea, the waters of the contiguous zone, or the oceans shall be
issued, after promulgation of guidelines established under subsection (c) of this section, except in
compliance with such guidelines.”83 Particularly in light of the broad definition of “the oceans”
in section 502(10) to include “any portion of the high seas beyond the contiguous zone,”84 the
ocean discharge criteria of section 403 clearly apply to all marine waters over which the United
States exercises jurisdiction, and even extend into international waters for an indeterminate
distance. The line of U.S. jurisdiction over surrounding ocean waters is now established by the

81

Id. at 842-843.

82

Id. at 843-844. (“If Congress has explicitly left a gap for the agency to fill, there is an express delegation of
authority to the agency to elucidate a specific provision of the statute by regulation. Such legislative regulations are
given controlling weight unless they are arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute. Sometimes the
legislative delegation to an agency on a particular question is implicit rather than explicit. In such a case, a court
may not substitute its own construction of a statutory provision for a reasonable interpretation made by the
administrator of an agency.”)

83

33 U.S.C. § 1343(a) (2000) (emphasis added).

84

33 U.S.C. § 1362(10) (2000).
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U.S. Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), as a band of the seas extending two hundred miles from
shore.85
Section 403(c) is generally entitled “Guidelines for determining degradation of waters.”86
Pursuant to subsection 403(a), these guidelines are to be applied in the issuance of NPDES
permits authorizing point source discharges to ocean waters. Subsection 403(c) itself, however,
does not contain any language expressly limiting the ocean discharge criteria to discharges
directly to the waters listed in 403(a).87 Subsection 403(c) is, in fact, silent on this subject. This
silence is properly interpreted as an implicit delegation of authority to the EPA under the
Chevron analytical framework. While the very title of section 403, stating simply “ocean
discharge criteria,” may be read as implicitly limiting the section to discharges directly to ocean
waters, such an interpretation is certainly not the only reasonable way to read the statute. 88
While legislative history establishes that regulation of such discharges directly to ocean waters
was, at least, the intended focus of this section,89 the legislative history does not suggest that this
is the only permissible application of the subsection 403(c) criteria. Thus, the remaining question

85

United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, December 10, 1982, art. 57, 21 I.L.M. 1261 (1982)
(Hereinafter, UNCLOS); see also Proclamation No. 5030, 48 Fed. Reg. 10,605 (Mar. 14, 1983) (establishing 200
mile EEZ).

86

33 U.S.C. § 1343(c) (2000).

87

Id.

88

See Robin Kundis Craig & Sarah Miller, Ocean Discharge Criteria and Marine Protected Areas: Ocean Water
Quality Protection Under the Clean Water Act, 29 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 1, 25-26 (2001) (Analyzing Section
403 and concluding that, because section 403 and the water quality standards provisions of section 303 both apply to
the territorial seas, that these sections, “cannot be treated as regulatory equivalents,” and noting that “because the
TMDL provisions, section 302, and the interstate provisions all refer to ‘water quality standards’ alone, these
provisions do not automatically apply in the contiguous zone and the ocean when EPA establishes ocean discharge
criteria for those water bodies.”).
89

See S. REP. NO. 92-414 (1971), 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3668, 3740. (“The disposal of pollutants into ocean waters is
regulated under this bill when it involves a discharge from any outfall beyond the shoreline of the United States or
any discharge into the territorial sea from a vessel.”)
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under Chevron is whether or not an EPA interpretation of sections 403 and 301(b)(1)(C) would
constitute a reasonable exercise of agency authority to fill a “gap” left by the statute.
The plain statutory language of subsection 403(c), read in light of the overall goals of the
Act, may reasonably be interpreted to delegate authority to the EPA to invoke its 403(c) criteria
as a basis for regulation of upstream discharges. In light of the aggressive goal of the Clean
Water Act to “restore and maintain…the Nation’s waters,”90 this interpretation would clearly be
consistent with the purposes of the Act. Furthermore, the language of section 301(b)(1)(c),
requiring all pollution discharges to comply, not only with the water quality standards
provisions, but also with “any other federal law or regulation,” is very reasonably read to
incorporate the subsection 403(c) ocean discharge criteria. After all, by its plain language, the
phrase “any other federal law or regulation” reaches outside of the CWA. As such, it would be
imminently reasonable for the agency to conclude that this section also may link up with another
section of the same statute.
Finally, any such EPA decision to set federal water quality standards under section 403
would be particularly reasonable in light of the considerable expansion of U.S. jurisdiction over
its adjacent marine waters since the Clean Water Act passed in 1972. While the provisions of the
CWA regarding marine waters made sense in 1972, they make little sense today in light of this
jurisdictional expansion. When the Clean Water Act passed Congress, waters beyond three miles
from shore were considered part of “high seas.”91 The U.S. assertion of exclusive economic
rights to waters extending to 200 miles into the ocean (including exclusive fishing rights) make

90

91

33 U.S.C. § 1291(a) (2000) (emphasis added).
See OCEAN BLUE PRINT FOR THE 21ST CENTURY, supra note 46, at 73.
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these waters no longer a part of the “global commons.”92 The waters of the EEZ are now clearly
a part of “the Nation’s waters,” and it would be imminently reasonable for the EPA to exercise
an implicitly delegated authority to provide for their stewardship through the promulgation and
implementation of federal water quality standards.
Despite these arguments, the EPA has thus far only applied Section 403(c) to direct
discharges to ocean waters. 93 In 1980, the EPA adopted ocean discharge regulations which are
clearly applicable only to discharges directly to ocean waters.94 The EPA recently considered the
creation of new, section 403 ocean discharge criteria that would function more like water quality
standards. 95 Called “healthy ocean waters,” these proposed “hybrid” standards, as informally
proposed, were also clearly limited to direct discharges to ocean waters, applying within the band
of seas between 3 and 200 miles from shore.96 The three-mile inner limit corresponded with the
reach of state jurisdiction under the CWA in light of the Act’s concerns regarding federalism and
preservation of state authority.97 The outermost limit was also reasonable, corresponding with the
outer limit of the U.S. Exclusive Economic Zone. EPA informally considered these standards in
response to President Clinton’s May 26, 2000, Executive Order No. 13158 for Marine Protected
92

See 16 U.S.C. § 1811 (2000) (“Except as provided in section 1812 of this title, the United States claims, and will
exercise in the manner provided for in this chapter, sovereign rights and exclusive fishery management authority
over all fish, and all Continental Shelf fishery resources, within the exclusive economic zone.”)
93

See 45 Fed. Reg. 65953 (Oct. 3, 1980); 40 C. F. R. §§ 125.120-125.12.

94

Id.

95

US EPA, Ocean Discharge Criteria: Revisions to Ocean Discharge Regulations, 40 C.F.R. Parts 122, 123 and
125 (Copy of proposal on file with the author); see also Public Hearing Notice, 65 Fed. Reg. 42936-01 (July 12,
2000); See also Robin Kundis Craig, supra note 88, at 29 (summarizing the EPA proposal).
96

See Robin Kundis Craig, supra note 88, at 29.

97

But see, Id. at 30 (arguing compellingly that EPA’s rule effectively limiting the application of section 403 to the
exclusively federal waters constituted a violation of the statute). In light of this concern, a more reasonable solution
would have been to create two different sets of section 403 regulations, applying essentially the current 403
standards to state waters, and applying the strengthened standards only to the exclusively federal waters as proposed.
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Areas.98 While the Bush administration has kept this executive order in place,99 the EPA has not
again proposed strengthened section 403 standards.
The EPA should proceed with adoption of strengthened section 403 standards for all U.S.
ocean waters. Because subsection 403(c) is not properly viewed as imprisoned within the section
of the statute within which it is housed, this section, particularly when linked with section
301(b)(1)(C), reaches well beyond the requirements of subsection 403(a). Thus, EPA should also
explicitly provide that these standards may be invoked, at the agency’s discretion, in order to
regulate land-based sources of pollution upstream.

The Water Quality Standards provisions of section 303.
Water quality standards are defined in the Act as consisting of “designated uses of the
navigable waters involved and the water quality criteria for such waters based upon such
uses.”100 The EPA considers an antidegradation policy to also constitute an element of water
quality standards.101 Water quality standards must be established by the states and approved by
the EPA, with disapproval triggering a mandatory duty for the EPA to promulgate federal
standards.102 States are to establish “fishable and swimmable” use classifications for their waters
consistent with the section 101(a)(2) goals of the Act that “wherever attainable, an interim goal
of water quality which provides for the protection and propagation of fish, shellfish and wildlife
98

Exec. Order No. 13,158, 65 Fed. Reg. at 34,911 (May 26, 2000) (mandating that the EPA, “relying upon existing
Clean Water Act authorities, shall expeditiously propose new science-based regulations, as necessary, to ensure
appropriate levels of protection for the marine environment.”).

99

See Robin Kundis Craig, supra note 88, at 7, citing to a Press Release, Donald. L. Evans, Secretary of Commerce.

100

33 U.S.C. § 1313(c)(2)(A) (2000).

101

See 40 C.F.R. § 131.12; 33 U.S.C. § 1313(d)(4)(B) (2000).

102

See 33 U.S.C. §§ 1313(a) to 1313(c) (2000).
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and provides for recreation in and on the water be achieved by July 1, 1983.”103 Specific water
quality criteria for each use classification are set with the support of “information and
guidelines” developed by the U.S. EPA under section 304(a).104 EPA may cite its 304(a) criteria
as a basis for disapproving state-established criteria.105 States are required to consider revision of
their standards at least once every three years, holding public hearings for this purpose.106 This
standards review process is often referred to as the “triennial review” of water quality standards;
however, states frequently allow more than three years to elapse without conducting the required
triennial reviews.107
Where water quality standards are not met, the Act requires the states and the EPA to
develop Total Maximum Daily Loads (TMDLs) to restore ambient conditions to levels meeting
or exceeding applicable standards.108 A TMDL is essentially a “pollution budget” for a particular
pollutant that is causing a water body to violate its applicable water quality standards.109 A
TMDL is comprised of a Waste Load Allocation (WLA) for all point sources, a Load Allocation
(LA) for all nonpoint sources, and a margin of safety.110 Generally, the states and tribes develop

103

33 U.S.C. § 1291(a)(2) (2000). See also US EPA, WATER QUALITY STANDARDS HANDBOOK, SECOND EDITION
(EPA, 1994), available at http://www.epa.gov/waterscience/standards/handbook/.
104

33 U.S.C. § 1314(a) (2000).

105

See Mississippi Commission on Natural Resources v. Costle, 625 F.2d 1269 (5th Cir. 1980) (Upholding EPA's
disapproval of Mississippi’s state water quality criteria for dissolved oxygen based in part on the inconsistency of
Mississippi’s criteria with EPA’s 304(a) criteria).
106

See 33 U.S.C. § 1313(c)(1) (2000); 40 C.F.R § 131.20.

107

See River Network’s Clean Water Act website at www.rivernetwork.org.

108

See 33 U.S.C. § 1313(d) (2000).

109

See 33 U.S.C. § 1313(c) (2000); 40 CFR § 131.

110

See 40 C.F.R. § 130.7; See also EPA TMDL Website at http://www.epa.gov/owow/tmdl/.
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TMDLs subject to EPA approval or disapproval. TMDLs are pollutant-specific and apply to all
sources of a problem pollutant contributing to a violation, including nonpoint sources.111
The water quality standards analysis of Gulf hypoxia encounters trouble at step one: it is
not clear whether water quality standards apply at all to most of the waters affected by Gulf
hypoxia. The CWA concerns itself with the integrity of “the Nations waters,”112 and proceeds to
divide these waters into three categories: 1) the “navigable waters” (which includes the
“territorial seas”), 113 2) the “contiguous zone,”114 and 3) “the oceans.”115 At the time the CWA
was enacted, as is generally the case today, states had jurisdiction over a band of the seas
extending three miles from the shoreline.116 The Clean Water Act likewise defines the territorial
seas as “the belt of the seas measured from the line of ordinary low water along that portion of
the coast which is in direct contact with the open sea and the line marking the seaward limit of
inland waters, and extending a seaward distance of three miles.”117 Section 303(c), in turn,
requires the states to set water quality standards for its waters, referring to “the navigable waters
111

See Pronsolino v. Nastri, 291 F.3d 1123 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding that TMDLs are to be developed for waters
impaired exclusively by nonpoint sources).

112

33 U.S.C. § 1291(a) (2000).

113

33 U.S.C. § 1362(7) (2000) (defining the term “navigable waters” as “the waters of the United States, including
the territorial seas.”).
114

33 U.S.C. § 1362(9) (2000).

115

33 U.S.C. § 1362(10) (2000).

116

See Submerged Lands Act of 1953, 43 U.S.C § 1312 (“The seaward boundary of each original coastal state is
approved and confirmed as a line three geographical miles distant from its coast line.”) but see U. S. v. Florida, 425
U.S. 791, 792 (1976) (holding that Florida possesses expanded maritime jurisdiction: “As against the United States,
the State of Florida is entitled to all the lands, minerals, and other natural resources underlying the Gulf of Mexico
extending seaward for a distance of 3 marine leagues from its coastline or its historic coastline, whichever is
landward, but for not less than 3 geographic miles from its coastline”); see also U.S. v. States of La., Tex., Miss.,
Ala. and Fla., 363 U.S. 1 (1960) (also holding that the Submerged Lands Act granted to Texas the submerged lands
in the Gulf of Mexico within three marine leagues from her coast, but that the Act did not grant Louisiana,
Mississippi or Alabama any rights in submerged lands beyond three geographic miles from their coasts.).
117

33 U.S.C. § 1362(8) (2001).

23

Brad McLane

Gulf Hypoxia

involved.”118 As discussed in more detail below, while section 303’s use of this phrase does not
expressly limit the application of water quality standards to these waters, the clear implication of
this section’s silence regarding “the oceans” and “the contiguous zone” is that water quality
standards are indeed confined to the “navigable waters” as that term is defined in the Act.
While the water quality standards provisions of sections 303 do not appear to reach
beyond “the navigable waters,” this section does provide the most promising statutory source of
authority for a regulatory regime to address that portion of Gulf hypoxia that occurs within the
navigable waters. Federal regulations require point source discharges to comply with “the
applicable water quality requirements of all affected States.”119 Thus, if a portion of Gulf
hypoxia occurs within the “navigable waters” in the State of Louisiana, a regulatory regime
could be based upon the violation of water quality standards in these waters.

Water Quality Standards Analysis of Gulf hypoxia in Louisiana Jurisdictional Waters.
The Louisiana Department of Environmental Quality (LDEQ) has established water
quality standards for the coastal waters within its jurisdiction.120 Louisiana's dissolved oxygen
criteria establish enforceable numeric standards of 4 mg/l in estuarine waters and 5 mg/l in
coastal waters “except when natural conditions cause this value to be lower.”121 LDEQ has also

118

See 33 U.S.C. §§ 1313(c)(2)(A) & 1313(c)(4) (2001).

119

See 40 C.F.R. § 122.4(d); See also, Arkansas v. Oklahoma, 503 U.S. 91 (1992) (upholding 40 C.F.R. § 122.4(d)).

120

See LA. ADMIN. CODE tit. 33, § 1123(C)(3) (April, 2005) (Louisiana classifies “Atchafalaya Bay & Delta and
Gulf Waters to the State Three-Mile Limit” and “Mississippi River Basin Costal Bays and Gulf Waters to the State
Three-Mile Limit” with the following four use classifications: Primary Contact Recreation; Secondary Contact
Recreation; Propagation of Fish and Wildlife; & Oyster Propagation.”), available at
http://www.deq.state.la.us/planning/regs/title33/33v09.pdf.
121

See LA. ADMIN. CODE tit. 33, § 1113(C)(3)(c) (April, 2005).
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adopted a narrative nutrient criterion for its waters. 122 Unfortunately, however, this standard is
rather toothless.
Although Gulf hypoxia (DO levels < 2 mg/l) would appear to clearly constitute a
violation of Louisiana’s dissolved oxygen criteria,123 neither the State of Louisiana nor the EPA
has found that a portion of the Gulf hypoxic area occurs in Louisiana jurisdictional waters.
Despite compelling evidence that a portion of Gulf hypoxia does extend into Louisiana waters,124
LDEQ has not listed any of its coastal waters as impaired,125 nor has the EPA disapproved the
state list and promulgated a federal 303(d) list recognizing the impairment of these waters.126 In
fact, LDEQ staff believe that low dissolved oxygen conditions in portions of Louisiana marine
waters are either improving, or are distinct from Gulf hypoxia.127 Thus, the State of Louisiana

122

See LA. ADMIN. CODE tit. 33, § 1113(B)8 (April, 2005) (“The naturally occurring range of nitrogen-phosphorous ratios shall be
maintained. This range shall not apply to designated intermittent streams. To establish the appropriate range of ratios and compensate
for natural seasonal fluctuations, the administrative authority will use site-specific studies to establish limits for nutrients. Nutrient
concentrations that produce aquatic growth to the extent that it creates a public nuisance or interferes with designated water uses shall
not be added to any surface waters.”).

123

One explanation for how a 4 or 5mg/l DO water quality criterion could theoretically coexist with hypoxia without
it being recognized as a violation is provided by the possibility that the standards only require monitoring for
dissolved oxygen levels near the surface. This illustrates the importance of insuring that dissolved oxygen standards
explicitly apply throughout the water column and that monitoring be conducted at depth.
124

This argument is based upon unpublished water quality data (provided by Dr. Nancy Rabalais, on file with the
author) and personal communications with Dr. Nancy Rabalais.
125

Louisiana Department of Environmental Quality, Final 2004 303(d) List, available at
http://www.deq.state.la.us/technology/tmdl/TMDL%202004IRCat%205_revised0604.pdf.

126

See Louisiana Department of Environmental Quality (LDEQ) web site at
http://www.deq.state.la.us/planning/wqireports/2004wqireports.htm (last visited, April 3, 2005). According to the
(LDEQ) web site, The final 2004 303(d) list was submitted to the US EPA for approval on October 19, 2004; and
EPA has yet to approve or disapprove this list.
127

An E-mail from Dugan Sabins, LDEQ to Brad McLane, dated May 18, 2005, stated as follows: “Louisiana
currently lists subsegment 050901 – Mermentau River Basin Coastal Bays and Gulf Waters to State three-mile limit
as being impaired by low dissolved oxygen. However, Louisiana’s ambient water quality monitoring network
sampled this subsegment and found the dissolved oxygen criterion was being met. Due to documented presence of
some hypoxic conditions during recent shelf wide summer hypoxia monitoring, Louisiana elected to include this
subsegment as impaired for low dissolved oxygen. Research on the hypoxic zone issue has indicated that most of the
zone is outside of Louisiana jurisdictional waters; therefore, with the exception of 050901 the zone does not need to
be considered on Louisiana’s §303(d) List. While some estuarine waters within Louisiana are listed for low
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and the EPA have not yet found that Gulf hypoxia occurs in Louisiana jurisdictional waters. As
such, Louisiana is not in a strong position to complain about pollution discharges in upstream
states.
In light of the legal and practical importance of determining whether or not hypoxia
extends into Louisiana jurisdictional waters, the Louisiana DEQ, EPA, and stakeholders, should
carefully consider whether Lousiana waters should be listed on the state’s 303(d) list due to
hypoxia.128 At the same time, it would be appropriate for Louisiana to review its water quality
standards.129 Particularly if hypoxia is found to occur in Louisiana waters, LDEQ should
consider developing numeric nitrogen and phosphorus criteria and reevaluate the dissolved
oxygen criteria applicable to its marine waters.130 The combination of the adoption of stronger
water quality standards, and official recognition of hypoxia as an ambient condition which
violates those standards, would place LDEQ and the EPA in a stronger position to challenge
pollution discharges in upstream states.

Beyond the “navigable waters:” do sections 303 and 304(a) grant EPA authority to set standards
for Gulf hypoxia occurring in waters beyond the territorial seas?
Turning now to consider the applicability of the water quality standards sections of the Act
beyond the territorial seas, the following three questions are presented. First, does Section 304(a)
dissolved oxygen, the sources of these impairments are not related to the Gulf of Mexico hypoxic zone. This
assessment is expected to remain the same for Louisiana’s 2006 §303(d) List.”
128

If EPA believes that hypoxia occurs in Louisiana waters, despite an LDEQ determination to the contrary, EPA
could disapprove LDEQ’s 2004 303(d) list and promulgate an expanded list with Gulf hypoxia affected waters
included.

129

Louisiana completed its last “triennial review” in 1999. See River Network web site at
http://www.rivernetwork.org/cleanwater/cwa_search.asp.

130

see US EPA, AMBIENT WATER QUALITY CRITERIA FOR DISSOLVED OXYGEN (SALTWATER): CAPE COD TO CAPE
HATTERAS (2000) (providing an example of marine dissolved oxygen criteria published by EPA pursuant to section
304(a) of the CWA).
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of the Clean Water Act give EPA independent authority to set enforceable water quality criteria
for exclusively federal marine waters? Second, does the Act’s silence in Section 303(c) regarding
the EPA Administrator’s authority to set water quality standards for exclusively federal waters,
read in light of the statute as a whole, constitute a “plain language” limitation on EPA authority:
or, does this Congressional silence constitute a delegation of discretionary authority to the
Administrator to set federal water quality standards for these waters? Third, even if the statute
was clear at the time of its passage, has evolving international law implicitly amended the Clean
Water Act’s definitions of the “contiguous zone” and/or the “territorial seas,” thereby expanding
the EPA’s delegation of authority under the statute? These questions are answered in reverse
order, keeping in mind the Chevron analytical framework.

Has evolving international law effectively amended the Clean Water Act?
At the time of the CWA’s passage, there was a nice consistency between the extent of U.S.
jurisdiction over the seas, the extent of state jurisdiction over the seas, and the CWA’s definition
of the territorial seas: all three extended three miles from shore.131 While the CWA’s definition
of the territorial sea has not changed since 1972, this jurisdictional line has changed considerably
since then as a function of the evolution of international law. Thus, the U.S. territorial seas now
extend 12 nautical miles from shore.132 Likewise, the CWA’s definition of the contiguous zone

131

See 43 U.S.C § 1312 (“The seaward boundary of each original coastal state is approved and confirmed as a line
three geographical miles distant from its coast line.”); See also 33 U.S.C. § 1362(8) (2000)
(CWA definition of territorial seas); Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, Apr. 29, 1958,
[1964] 15 U.S.T. 1606 (stating that states may claim sovereignty over a band of the territorial sea extending three
miles from the baseline); See also U.S. v. Alaska, 521 U.S. 1, 8 (1997) (discussing the 3 mile extent of the U.S.
territorial seas prior to the extension of the U.S. territorial seas to 12 miles pursuant to Proclamation 5928.).
132

See UNCLOS, December 10, 1982, art. 3, 21 I.L.M. 1261 (1982)(stating that “Every state has the right to
establish the breadth of its territorial sea up to a limit not exceeding 12 nautical miles.”); See also Proclamation No.
5928, Territorial Sea of the United States of America, 54 Fed. Reg. 777. (December 27, 1988) (extending the US
territorial sea “to 12 nautical miles from the baselines of the United States determined in accordance with
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remains unchanged, while as a matter of international law, the contiguous zone now extends 24
nautical miles seaward.133 These changes destroy the formerly existing, carefully-crafted
coherence of the Clean Water Act’s structure,134 begging the question of how to match up these
newly-created “exclusive federal” waters with the various provisions of the Act.135
There is a compelling argument that the evolution of international law has resulted in a
modification of the CWA’s definition of the contiguous zone, because the Act’s definition of that
term is itself based on international law.136 The practical effect of such a definitional change
would be relevant to only three sections of the Clean Water Act. First, the modification could
expand the waters to which a waiver of secondary treatment standards for sewage discharges to
the oceans may be secured under section 301(h),137 likely having no practical effect on the
implementation of the law. Second, the requirement that “any vessel of the Armed Forces subject
to the regulations [promulgated by the Secretary of Defense, operating] in the navigable waters

international law,” and noting that nothing in it “extends or otherwise alters existing Federal or State law or any
jurisdiction, rights, legal interests, or obligations derived therefrom.”).
133

See UNCLOS, December 10, 1982, art. 33(2), 21 I.L.M. 1261 (1982) (“The contiguous zone may not extend
beyond 24 nautical miles from the baslines from which the breadth of the territorial seas is measured”); See also, 64
Fed. Reg. 48701 (Aug. 2, 1999) (Executive Order of President Clinton expanding the contiguous zone to 24 miles).
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See S. REP. NO. 92-414 (1971), 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3668, 3743 (“The Committee has added definitions of the
terms territorial seas, contiguous zone, and ocean to describe clearly the jurisdictional limits of the Act, and provide
a basis for its relationship to other laws of the United States as well as to international law.”).
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While this note uses the term “exclusively federal” waters as a shorthand term to refer to the band of the seas
extending between three and two hundred nautical miles from shore, it should be noted that Texas and Florida have
general jurisdiction over a 12 mile band of seas extending into the Gulf. See note 116. However, these states still
have only a three mile jurisdiction over these waters for purposes of the CWA.
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See 33 U.S.C. § 1362(9) (2000) (Defining the contiguous zone as “the entire zone established or to be established by the United
States under Article 24 of the Convention of the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous zone.”); See also Convention on the Territorial Sea
and Contiguous Zone, April 29, 1958, art. 24, 15 U.S.T. 1606 (defining the contiguous zone as “a zone of the high seas contiguous to
its territorial sea…The contiguous zone may not extend beyond twelve miles from the baseline from the breadth of the territorial sea is
measured.”); Also see 64 Fed. Reg. 48701 (Aug. 2, 1999) (expanding US contiguous zone pursuant to UNCLOS).
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33 U.S.C. § 1311(h) (2001) (“For the purposes of this subsection the phrase ‘the discharge of any pollutant into
marine waters’ refers to a discharge into deep waters of the territorial seas or the waters of the contiguous zone,...”).
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of the United States or the waters of the contiguous zone [must be] equipped with any required
marine pollution control device meeting standards established under this subsection…” would
apply to this larger band of waters.138 Third, and most importantly, section 311 regarding “Oil
and hazardous substances liability” would apply within this expanded band of waters.139
With respect to the territorial seas, however, any argument that the expansion of this band
of seas as a matter of international law has likewise expanded the term as defined in the Clean
Water Act is tenuous at best. The CWA expressly defines the territorial seas as a “belt of the
seas…extending seaward a distance of three miles” without reference to international law.140 The
fact that the contiguous zone is defined by reference to international law, while the territorial
seas are defined explicitly in a manner corresponding with the extent of state jurisdiction over
marine waters, suggests that this term was defined less with international law in mind.
In summary, while the evolution of international law expanding the contiguous zone may
have modified the Act’s definition of this term, the expansion of the “territorial seas” has clearly
not changed this term as defined in the CWA.

Interpreting Congressional silence in Section 303: “plain language” or an “implicit delegation of
authority”?

Section 303 of the CWA is silent with respect to those waters beyond the “navigable
waters.” Does this silence, read in light of the Act as a whole, mean that the EPA may set
exclusively federal standards for these waters, or does it mean that Congress intended section
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33 U.S.C. § 1322 (2001).

139

See 33 U.S.C. § 1321(b)(1) (2001).

140

See 33 U.S.C. § 1362(8) (2001).
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303 to apply exclusively to the navigable waters, with sections 403 (ocean discharges) and 311
(oil and hazardous substances liability) providing the only means for ensuring the stewardship of
more distant ocean waters? This presents a close question, and it should be noted that a court
could easily find the statutes silence to constitute either ambiguity (thus inviting the agency to
“fill the gap” left by the statute) or a clear limit on EPA authority.The best answer to this
question, however, is that the section’s references to the navigable waters, combined with its
silence regarding the contiguous zone and the oceans, constitutes a plain language limitation on
the agency’s authority under Section 303. In Russello v. U.S., the Supreme Court stated that
“where Congress includes particular language in one section of a statute but omits it in another
section of the same Act… it is generally presumed that Congress acts intentionally… in the
disparate inclusion or exclusion.”141
A counter argument to this conclusion may proceed as follows. 142 Congressional silence in
section 303(c) should be considered in light of the purpose of the Clean Water Act to “restore
and maintain the chemical, physical and biological integrity of the Nation’s waters.” The drafters
of the Act considered it to be a “comprehensive” statute to that end, and the hole that exists
absent federal establishment of water quality standards for exclusively federal waters is
inconsistent with this understanding of the Act as “comprehensive.” Second, the CWA’s
“cooperative federalism” structure is a product of Congressional concern that the Act should
respect the states’ authorities to initially establish water quality standards for their waters, setting
standards as stringent as desired, but not below minimally acceptable federal requirements. The
very rationale for allowing states to set water quality standards first for waters within their
141

Russello v. U.S., 464 U.S. 16, 23 (1983).
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See Robin Kundis Craig, supra note 88, at 34-36 ( Analyzing the Clean Water Act and reaching the conclusion
that the EPA does have discretionary authority under the Act to set standards for these federal waters).
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jurisdiction is obviously absent in the practice of EPA setting federal standards for federal
waters: such an activity clearly does not infringe in any way on state authority.
This line of analytical reasoning begs the question of why, if federalism was its sole
concern, did Congress not explicitly grant the EPA the power to set water quality standard for
the “contiguous zone” and “the oceans” as well? The most likely answer is that such an exercise
of the United States Power would have been an extraterritorial assertion of authority that would
have made little sense under international law as it existed at the time. Why would Congress
have established water quality standards for the “high seas,” waterswhich were beyond its
territorial jurisdiction? This suggests that “ocean discharge criteria” attach more to the
“discharges” themselves than tothe “water s.” The U.S. clearly had jurisdiction to regulate
discharges into these international waters, even it did not have jurisdiction over the waters
themselves. The U.S. could regulate such discharges by its nationals, as well as in any case
where such discharge could cause a nuisance within the U.S. territorial waters.143 Today,
however, the U.S. not only maintains exclusive jurisdiction over the territorial seas, its
jurisdiction over the waters of the EEZ is likewise extremely broad. For these reasons,
Congressional silence could be construed as an implicit delegation of authority to the EPA to set
federal water quality standards for waters beyond the territorial seas.
Under Section 303(c)(4)(B), the EPA is charged with the duty to “promptly prepare and
publish proposed water quality standards for the navigable waters… in any case where the
Administrator determines that a revised or new standard is necessary to meet the requirements of
143

See State of New Jersey v. City of New York, 283 U.S. 473, 482 (1931) (holding as follows: “Defendant contends
that, as it dumps the garbage into the ocean and not within the waters of the United States or of New Jersey, this
Court is without jurisdiction to grant the injunction. But the defendant is before the Court and the property of
plaintiff and its citizens that is alleged to have been injured by such dumping is within the Court's territorial
jurisdiction. The situs of the acts creating the nuisance, whether within or without the United States, is of no
importance.”)
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this chapter.” The reference to the “navigable waters” need not be read as words of limitation,
but rather as words of description explaining the section’s provisions as they were to be applied
in light of the snapshot of international law that Congress saw at the time it passed the CWA.
Likewise, the preceding step of “disapproving” state standards before promulgating federal ones
should not be viewed as the exclusive means of setting federal standards, but rather as a process
informed by federalism concerns, concernswhich are irrelevant to the analysis of setting federal
standards for federal waters.
Despite these compelling, purpose-based arguments, the premise that section 303 reaches
beyond the “navigable waters” is hard to reconcile with section 303’s use of that term. Because
section 303 is silent regarding the contiguous zone and the oceans, if EPA has discretionary
authority to set standards for these waters, such authority must be found either implicit within
section 303(c), or must exist elsewhere in the statute. However, no other section of the Act may
reasonably be read to grant the EPA the requisite authority to set standards for federal waters.
While section 501(a) grants the EPA Administrator the authority to “prescribe such regulations
as are necessary to carry out his functions under this chapter,”144 such a general grant of
authority to promulgate regulations does not empower the Administrator to promulgate
regulations exceeding the grant of authority provided in the statute. This leaves only section
304(a) as a possible independent basis for the EPA to adopt water quality standards for federal
waters.

144

33 U.S.C. § 1361 (2001).
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Section 304(a): an independent source of authority for setting federal criteria?
Under section 304(a), EPA is charged with the duty to develop federal “criteria” and
“guidelines,” which have thus far been used exclusively both to guide states in setting water
quality standards, and to guide the EPA in its review of such proposed standards. However,
Congressional silence regarding the limits of section 304(a) could likewise be read as an implicit
delegation of authority. The language of CWA section 304(a)(2)(A) clearly applies to all waters
of the United States, including “the oceans.”145 Section 304(a)(1)(C) also clearly mandates the
development of criteria regarding “the effects of pollutants on biological community diversity,
productivity, and stability, including information on the factors affecting rates of eutrophication.”
Under section 304(a)(1), EPA must “from time to time thereafter revise [such criteria] accurately
reflecting the latest scientific knowledge.” EPA has not established such section 304(a)(1)
criteria for the Gulf, nor has it explicitly published any of its Gulf hypoxia studies under
authority of section 304(a)(2) as “information” to guide the restoration of these waters.
In order to find a basis in law for the agency to change course and publish such
“information” and/or “criteria” as enforceable standards, this section must be sufficiently
ambiguous that it may reasonably be found to constitute an “implicit” delegation of authority.
However, legislative history suggests that Congress intended this section only as a form of
guidance, not as a basis for regulation. The Senate Report states as follows: “The development of
information which describes the relationship of pollutants to water quality is essential for
carrying out the objective of the Act. This information, known as criteria, is required under
Section 304(a) to be developed and published by the Administrator and issued to the states and
145

See 33 U.S.C. § 1314(a)(2) (“The Administrator, after consultation..., shall develop and publish, within one year
after October 18, 1972 (and from time to time thereafter revise) information (A) on the factors necessary to restore
and maintain the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of all navigable waters, ground waters, waters of the
contiguous zone, and the oceans....”)
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public.”146 The combination of the structure of the Act, the legislative history, and the EPA’s
long-followed practice of using this section only as an informational kind of section, suggests
that it may not be invoked as a source of regulatory authority over federal waters. However, its
use of the term “criteria” does present an argument to the contrary. To the extent that this section
is ambiguous, an EPA interpretation of it as granting the agency authority to promulgate
enforceable criteria for federal waters would likely constitute a “reasonable interpretation”
entitled to deference from a court.147

Conclusion regarding ambient standards provisions of the Clean Water Act.
In conclusion, it is not clear whether sections 303 and 304(a) of the CW
A grant the EPA
authority to set water quality standards for federal waters. Section 303 is silent with respect to
these waters. Although such a grant of authority may be found implicit within this section, no
other section of the statute may be read to help fill the gap left by its silence with respect to the
oceans beyond the “navigable waters.” Section 304(a)’s use of the term “criteria” may be read to
establish enforceable standards, or read as only authorizing the agency to establish guidelines.
Nevertheless, this note concludes that these sections may not be read as granting the agency
authority to set federal standards for federal ocean waters. Thus, the EPA would need to base a
regulatory regime for the Gulf of Mexico hypoxic waters on the following three sources of
authority: (1) the section 403 ocean discharge criteria; (2) section 301(b)(1)(C)’s broad mandate
(discussed further below in the context of the ESA and MSA); and (3) water quality standards for
the navigable waters of Louisiana established under section 303.
146

S. REP. NO. 92-414 (1971), reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3668, 3716 (emphasis added), available at 1971 WL
11307.
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See Robin Kundis Craig, supra note 88, at 34-36 (finding that section 304(a) does grant EPA authority to set and
enforce federal water quality criteria for federal waters)
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TMDL Development and Implementation: Reaching for Upstream Point Source Dischargers
The next curve along this long and winding road to a regulatory regime would be for the
EPA to establish nitrogen and phosphorus TMDLs for the Gulf of Mexico. The EPA, working in
conjunction with Louisiana, may clearly establish such TMDLs based upon a finding that
Louisiana waters are impaired pursuant to 303(d). Section 303(d) itself, however, is silent with
respect to whether a TMDL may be created in order to address a violation of section 403 criteria.
However, this silence is not fatal. Because section 301(b)(1)(C) requires discharges to comply
with “any other federal law or regulation,” and because regulations established pursuant to
section 403 would constitute such “other regulations,” it is reasonable to conclude that point
source permits under section 402 may be based upon, if not a TMDL itself, then at least a
“TMDL-like analysis,” in order to ensure compliance with EPA regulations creating ocean
discharge criteria under authority of section 403. As such, EPA may develop a federal TMDL for
federal waters pursuant to sections 301(b)(1)(C) and 403, and, in conjunction with Louisiana, for
the impaired navigable waters pursuant to section 303(d).
While implementation of TMDLs is not mandatory under the Act, it certainly would be a
reasonable exercise of agency authority. Implementation could include a combination of the
following three measures. First, EPA could review, and disapprove as appropriate, state water
quality standards for upstream states under 303(c), promulgating federal criteria as necessary.
However, in this process, EPA could only consider impairment of the navigable waters, not of
the ocean discharge criteria downstream. Second, EPA could veto individual state-issued
NPDES permits under its expressly delegated authority in sections 402(d)(2)(A) (in response to a
request from a state) or 402(d)(2)(B) (an objection to a state-issued permit as “being outside the
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guidelines and requirements of this chapter”).148 The broad authority granted to the
Administrator under section 402(d)(2)(B) establishes that the Administrator may object to stateissued permits citing the fact that such permits cause or contribute not only to water quality
standards downstream, but also to downstream ocean discharge criteria. Third, EPA could create
a framework for federal implementation of a pollution trading program for nutrient discharges as
already discussed in detail above. Finally, environmental groups could use citizen suits and
permit appeals to try to ensure implementation of the regime. The extent to which the EPA’s use
of these implementation measures would withstand judicial review, as well as the ability of
public interest groups to use citizen suits and permit appeals to keep agency implementation “on
track,” are both open questions.
It is not clear how judicial review of an EPA 402(d)(2) permit veto would proceed.
Imagine a case where the EPA vetoed several permits in Illinois that were each responsible for
an almost immeasurably small “portion” of Gulf hypoxia downstream. Should the standard for
establishing a water quality standards violation in such cases of an EPA exercise of its veto
authority be the same as where a citizen challenges a permit? The answer to this question is not
clear, although presumably the agency decision to exercise its authority would receive Chevron
deference.
Absent an EPA veto, however, environmental groups could appeal permits authorizing,
or reauthorizing, point source discharges to upstream waters in state agency “quasi-adjudicative”
proceedings. EPA has promulgated implementing regulations for the Clean Water Act providing
that "No permit may be issued ... when the imposition of conditions cannot ensure compliance
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33 U.S.C. § 1342(d) (2001).
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with the applicable water quality requirements of all affected States."149 In the case of Arkansas
v. Oklahoma, the Supreme Court upheld this regulation, as well as an EPA interpretation of it
that a permit “should be upheld if the record shows by a preponderance of the evidence that the
authorized discharges would not cause an actual detectable violation.”150 However, in Arkansas
v. Oklahoma, the EPA was issuingfederal permits pursuant to Section 402(a) of the Clean Water
Act. Today, all but one of the Mississippi River Basin states have been delegated NPDES
permitting authority and are issuing permits under 402(b),151 raising the question of whether or
not theArkansas v. Oklahoma holding applies to such state issued permits. The Court in
Arkansas v. Oklahoma expressly declined to answer questions regarding the proper scope of this
regulation in the context of state permitting.152 At the same time, however, the Court concluded
in a footnote that this restriction does apply “whether the permit is issued by the EPA or by an
approved state program....”153 Thus, the open question regards the meaning of this regulation in
cases where the state issues an NPDES permit pursuant to section 402(b).154
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40 C.F.R. § 122.4(d) (emphasis added).
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Arkansas v. Oklahoma, 503 U.S. 91, 97 (1992).
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See EPA web site at http://cfpub.epa.gov/npdes/statestats.cfm (As of the date of publication, only six states do
not have “primacy” to issue permits under section 402(b) of the Act. These states are Alaska, Idaho, New
Hampshire, Massachusetts, New Mexico, and Arizona. Thus, New Mexico is the only state without primacy with
some territory within the Mississippi River basin.).

152

See 503 U.S. 91, 104 (1992) (“Moreover, much of the analysis and argument in the briefs of the parties relies on
statutory provisions that govern not only federal permits issued pursuant to §§ 401(a) and 402(a), but also state
permits issued under § 402(b). It seems unwise to evaluate these arguments in a case such as these, which only
involve a federal permit.”).
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See Arkansas v. Oklahoma, 503 U.S. at 105, footnote 10.
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It should also be noted that Oklahoma’s antidegration policy was at issue in this case, not a violation of a numeric
water quality standard downstream, leaving open the question of the proper interpretation of the 40 C.F.R. § 122
“prohibitions” on discharges as applied to a permit challenge alleging contribution to an impairment of a numerical
criterion.
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Assuming, nonetheless, that this regulation at least retains a comparable meaning in the
context of a state administrative appeal brought by an environmental group challenging a stateissued NPDES permit, the appellant would have an exceedingly slim chance of making the
requisite showing of causation. As such, absent aggressive EPA use of its veto authority over
state-issued permits that are not sufficiently stringent, permit appeals by environmental groups
are not likely to yield tighter controls. This means that the role of environmental and citizen
groups in pushing for implementation of any TMDL through permit appeals is not likely to be
effective, and that any regulatory regime to restore the Gulf of Mexico would almost wholly
depend upon an aggressive EPA exercise of delegated authority.

B. The Endangered Species Act (ESA) and the Magnuson –Stevens Fishery Conservation
and Management Act (MSA).
The Endangered Species Act (ESA) and the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and
Management Act (MSA) each impose additional duties on the EPA to take actions to address
Gulf hypoxia. Both statutes require the EPA to consult with the National Marine Fisheries
Service (NMFS) where the agency takes actions that may contribute to Gulf hypoxia. Section 7
of the ESA requires EPA to consult with NMFS with respect to marine species, in order to
ensure that actions “authorized, funded or carried out by such agency... [are] not likely to
jeopardize the continued existence of any endangered species or threatened species or result in
the destruction or adverse modification of [critical habitat].”155 The plain language of this section
requires the EPA to consult with NMFS prior to approving upstream state water quality
standards that fail to properly regulate nutrients that may impair the navigable waters
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16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2) (2001).
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downstream.156 The MSA also requires each federal agency to “consult with the Secretary with
respect to any action authorized, funded, or undertaken, or proposed to be authorized, funded, or
undertaken, by such agency that may adversely affect any essential fish habitat identified under
this chapter.”157 The ESA’s section 9 prohibits the “taking” of endangered species;158 and the
SFA mandates measures to protect Essential Fish Habitat.159
The MSA, as amended in 1996, requires the Fishery Management Councils (Councils) to
designate Essential Fish Habitat (EFH) as part of the development of Fishery Management Plans,
and take measures to protect such EFH areas.160 The Councils must “describe and identify
essential fish habitat for the fishery based on the guidelines established by the Secretary under
section 1855(b)(1)(A) of this title, minimize to the extent practicable adverse effects on such
habitat caused by fishing, and identify other actions to encourage the conservation and
enhancement of such habitat.”161 EFH for the Gulf of Mexico is defined to cover the entire Gulf,
extending to “all marine waters and substrates…from the shoreline to the seaward limit of the
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See John W. Steiger, Consultation Provision of Section 7(a)(2) of the Endangered Species
Act and its Application to Delegable Federal Programs, 21 ECOLOGY L.Q. 243, 246 (1994). (Considering whether
or not the consultation requirements apply to delegable federal programs, and concluding “that the weight of
authority and sound policy support applying section 7(a)(2) to all but a few delegable federal programs”)
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16 U.S.C. § 1855 (b)(2) (2001).
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16 U.S.C. § 1538 (2001).
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See 16 U.S.C. § 1801(b)(7) (2001) (Establishing the goal “to promote the protection of essential fish habitat in
the review of projects conducted under Federal permits, licenses, or other authorities that affect or have the potential
to affect such habitat.”). See also 16 U.S.C. § 1855(b)(4)(A). (requiring the Secretary of Commerce to make
recommendations to other state and federal agencies regarding activities which “would adversely affect” essential
fish habitat.)
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Id.
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16 U.S.C. § 1853(a)(7) (2001).
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exclusive economic zone.” 162 The Gulf of Mexico Fishery Management Council has stated that
“hypoxia…is a direct threat to EFH.”163
The Gulf of Mexico also provides habitat for five species of threatened or endangered sea
turtles, including the Kemp’s Ridley (Lepidochelys kempii),164 and the threatened Gulf sturgeon
(Acipenser oxyrinchus desotoi).165 The US Fish and Wildlife Service has found that, “in
comparison to other fish species, sturgeon have a limited behavioral and physiological capacity
to respond to hypoxia;” however, the area of the Gulf affected by hypoxia is not listed as critical
habitat for the Gulf sturgeon.166
When considered in conjunction with the requirements of the Clean Water Act, these
statutory requirements strengthen the agency’s hand in enforcing an interstate TMDL for the
Gulf of Mexico. The CWA specifically requires all pollution discharges to comply with all
federal laws and regulations. Section 301(b)(1)(c) of the Act states: "In order to carry out the
objective of this chapter there shall be achieved not later than July 1, 1977, any more stringent
limitation including those necessary to meet water quality standards,... or any other Federal law
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Marian Macpherson, “…To the Gulf Stream Waters:” Stewardship for Essential Fish Habitat, 18 TUL. ENVTL.
L.J. 97, 119 (2004) citing Gulf of Mexico Fishery Management Council, Generic Amendment for Addressing EFH
Requirements in the FMPs of the Gulf of Mexico (Oct. 1998) (codified at 50 C.F.R. § 622), available at http://
Galveston.ssp.nmfs.gov/efh/FINALEFH.PDF.
163
Gulf of Mexico Fishery Management Council, Draft Environmental Impact Statement for the Generic Essential
Fish Habitat Amendment to the Fishery Management Plans of the Gulf of Mexico, July, 2003 at 3-287, available at
http://www.nmfs.noaa.gov/habitat/habitatprotection/eis/Full%20Gulf%20EFH%20EIS%20703.PDF; See also Gulf
of Mexico Fishery Management Council, Generic Amendment for Addressing EFH Requirements in the FMPs of the
Gulf of Mexico, supra note 160 at 174-99.
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35 Fed. Reg. 18319 (December 2, 1970) (listing Kemp’s ridley as endangered), available at
http://ecos.fws.gov/species_profile/servlet/gov.doi.species_profile.servlets.Species_FRDoc#top (last visited May 17,
2005).
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See 56 Fed. Reg. 49653 (September 30, 1991) (listing the Gulf sturgeon as threatened), available at
http://ecos.fws.gov/tess_public/servlet/gov.doi.tess_public.servlets.VipListed?code=V&listings=0.
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68 Fed. Reg. 13369 (March 19, 2003) (listing critical habitat for the Gulf sturgeon).

40

Brad McLane

Gulf Hypoxia

or regulation...."167 This subsection, by its plain language, prohibits upstream discharges which
cause or contribute to degradation of marine waters downstream in violation of the goals of not
only the CWA, but also of other federal laws such as the MSA and the ESA.
Surprisingly, research identified only one published case dealing with the “or any other
federal law or regulation” language of section 301(b)(1)(C). While the Seventh Circuit rejected
the argument that this phrase imposed additional requirements on an NPDES permit in the case
of Porter County Chapter of the Izaak Walton League of America, Inc. v. Costle,168 it did so
because the federal law at issue in that case articulated no specific standard.169 However, the
broad mandate of Section 301(b)(1)(c) that point source discharges comply with all federal laws
and regulations constitutes a powerful and rarely considered provision of the Act that arguably
requires point source dischargers to comply with the provisions of the ESA and MSA. In
addition, EPA approval of state water quality standards that fail to include nutrient criteria
constitutes an action to allow discharges that contribute to the impairment of downstream
“navigable waters.” Because this impairment degrades essential fish habitat and could harm the
continued existence of threatened and endangered species in the Gulf, the federal approval of
state water quality standards triggers the consultation requirement under both the MagnusonStevens Act and the Endangered Species Act.

C. Looking to Congress for a Solution: The Debates Regarding Ratification of UNCLOS
and the Proposed Clean Water Authority Restoration Act of 2005.
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33 U.S.C. § 1311(b)(1)(c) (2001) (emphasis added).
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Porter County Chapter of the Izaak Walton League of America, Inc. v. Costle, 571 F.2d 359 (7th Cir. 1978).
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Id. at 367.
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While this note concludes that EPA does possess discretionary authority to implement a
regulatory regime to restore the impaired waters of the Gulf of Mexico, Congress should
nevertheless amend the CWA, granting the EPA clear authority to provide for the stewardship of
all US jurisdictional marine waters, and clarifying the marine jurisdictional lines drawn in the
Act. Opportunities to draw attention to the value of amending the CWA are found in two matters
of actual or likely debate in the 109th Congress: the proposed ratification of the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea, and the proposed Clean Water Authority Restoration Act of
2005.
The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) was negotiated in
1982 and entered into force on November 16, 1994. 170 UNCLOS has been called a “constitution
for the oceans.”171 UNCLOS contains 59 environmental provisions, including Article 192,
creating a broad obligation to protect and preserve the marine environment; Article 235,
providing for liability for pollution of the marine environment; and Article 207, imposing a duty
on parties to protect ocean waters through the regulation of land based sources of pollution.172
Unfortunately, the U.S. Senate has not yet ratified UNCLOS. Ratification of UNCLOS would
entail multiple benefits for the U.S., including improved national security, greater economic
development opportunities, improved ecological stewardship of the oceans generally, and
170

See UNCLOS, December 10, 1982, 21 I.L.M. 1261 (1982).

171

See, e.g. Lakshman Guruswamy, The promise of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
(UNCLOS)Justice in Trade and Environment Disputes 25 ECOLOGY L.Q. 189, 227.
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See UNCLOS, December 10, 1982, art. 207, 21 I.L.M. 1261 (1982) (“1. States shall adopt laws and regulations to
prevent, reduce and control pollution of the marine environment from land-based sources, including rivers, estuaries,
pipelines and outfall structures, taking into account internationally agreed rules, standards and recommended
practices and procedures. 2. states shall take other measures as may be necessary to prevent, reduce and control such
pollution. 3. States shall endeavor to harmonize their policies in this connection at the appropriate regional level. 4.
States, acting especially through competent international organizations or diplomatic conference, shall endeavour to
establish global and regional rules, standards and recommended practices and procedures to prevent, reduce, and
control pollution of the marine environment from land based sources….”)
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possibly further-extended jurisdiction over marine waters.173 As such, the U.S. Commission on
Ocean Policy recently joined the chorus of voices recommending that the U.S. ratify
UNCLOS.174
Throughout the history of its considerations, most commentators have expressed little
concern that U.S. environmental laws would need to be modified to meet its obligations. In the
Message From The President of the United States and Commentary accompanying UNCLOS’
transmittal to the Senate, the Clinton administration expressed confidence in the adequacy of
then existing environmental law, stating: “The United States already has national legislation
addressing land-based sources of marine pollution…. U.S. laws include the Clean Water Act...
which specifically addresses marine water quality.”175 On March 24, 2004, the U.S. Senate
Committee on Environment & Public Works held a hearing to consider ratification of
UNCLOS.176 These debates are permeated with the presumption that current U
.S. environmental
laws clearly meet all of the obligations of UNCLOS and that there would be no need to enact or
amend federal legislation as an incident of UNCLOS’ ratification.177
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See Message From The President of the United States and Commentary Accompanying the United Nations
Convention on the Law Of The Sea and The Agreement Relating To The Implementation Of The Part XI Upon Their
Transmittal To The United States Senate For Its Advice And Consent. S. TREATY DOC. 103-39, 103d Cong., 2d
Sess. (1994), reprinted in 7 GEO. INT'L ENVTL. L. REV 77.
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See OCEAN BLUE PRINT, supra note 46.
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See Message from the President, supra note 173, 7 GEO. INT'L ENVTL. L. REV. at 123.
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See “United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea,” Hearing Before the Senate Committee on Environment
and Public Works, 109th Congr. (2004), available at http://epw.senate.gov/hearing_statements.cfm?id=219579.
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See, Id. Statement of John F. Turner, Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental and
Scientific Affairs, Department of State (“As a party, the United States would be able to implement Part XII through
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The above analysis of the applicability of the Clean Water Act’s provisions to marine
waters, however, belies this assumption that the CWA does not need to be amended in order to
adequately implement the environmental obligations of UNCLOS.178 The U.S. Commission on
Ocean Policy also pointed out the lack of clarity in the marine jurisdictional lines in multiple
statutesand noted the need to “update federal laws” with respect to outdate marine
jurisdictions.179 Even if UNCLOS does not impose additional obligations on the U.S. to amend
its laws, the Senate should both ratify UNCLOS and contemporaneously propose legislation to
amend the CWA. The authority of the Congress to establish rules for the protection of the oceans
is without doubt.180 Such an amendment should require the EPA to establish water quality
standards for all federal ocean waters between the “three mile limit” and the seaward extent of
the EEZ within a reasonable period.
Yet another opportunity to remedy the lack of clarity in the Clean Water Act regarding its
jurisdiction over marine waters may be found in the proposed Clean Water Authority Restoration
Act of 2005.181 The stated purposes of this legislation are to “reaffirm the original intent of
Congress in enacting the Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972... to clearly
define the waters of the United States that are subject to the Federal Water Pollution Control Act;
[and] to provide protection to the waters of the United States to the fullest extent of the
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legislative authority of Congress under the constitution.”182 The proposed amendment would
strike the term “navigable waters” wherever it occurs in the Act, replacing that term with the
phrase “Waters of the United States.” The term “Waters of the United States” would be defined
broadly to extend to essentially all internal waters, but would not expand federal jurisdiction over
federal marine waters.183 The primary impetus for this proposed amendment was provided by the
Supreme Court’s decision in Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County v. United States
Army Corps of Engineers, which held that the Clean Water Act did not confer authority to the
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers to assert jurisdiction over an artificially created pond, because
this water body did not possess the requisite “significant nexus” to “navigable waters.”184 It
would be appropriate to amend this proposed legislation to also correct the jurisdictional issues
regarding marine waters. At the very least, debate regarding this legislation provides an
opportunity to raise awareness among Congressional leaders regarding the lack of clarity with
respect to the Clean Water Act’s jurisdiction over marine waters.

III. A Practical Analysis of a Regime for Gulf Hypoxia
In addition to considering the legal foundation upon which a regulatory pollution control
regime could be constructed, it is necessary to consider the practical incentives and disincentives
for the creation and implementation of a regulatory regime. Essentially, this inquiry considers
whether the long road toward establishing a regulatory regime is really worth the trouble. Given
the amount of energy and resources involved in creating a regulatory regime for Gulf hypoxia,
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proponents of such a regime will need to put forth a compelling argument that the benefits of
such a regime are worth the effort and costs. Because much of the benefit of creating such a
regime is found in the reduction of risks, the argument for a regulatory regime must rely heavily
on the “precautionary principle.”185 This section analyzes Gulf hypoxia using three models: an
interest group/political capital model; an analysis of the “structural features” of the underlying
transboundary pollution problem; and a variant of cost/benefit analysis.
One form of practical analysis of the proposed pollution control regime is essentially a
political one. Such an analysis attempts to anticipate the likely proponents and opponents of such
a regime, and to ascertain both the political power and moral suasion on each side of the ledger.
A regulatory regime for the Gulf of Mexico will not form without strong support from interest
groups possessing sufficient “political capital” that they are willing to “expend” in exerting
pressure on elected and appointed officials. Interests thatwill almost certainly resist further
regulation include upstream states, farmers and fertilizer manufacturers, and industrial and
municipal point sources of nutrients. In addition, agency inertia is not to be underrated as a
powerful force to overcome. The transformation of the currently extant voluntary regime into a
regulatory one would entail increased administrative costs at the U.S. EPA, which the agency
may be loathe to undertake absent specific appropriations or a clear statutory mandate. Interests
that would likely support a regulatory pollution control regime for the Gulf of Mexico include
fishery-related businesses and environmental groups. However, if a sufficient faction of these
groups prefers to work toward voluntary consensus, then the current regime is almost guaranteed
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to continue. Given the present lack of a statutory mandate for a Gulf hypoxia regulatory regime,
a unified and well-organized effort by both Gulf of Mexico fishing and environmental interests
will be necessary to create one.
Another mode of practical analysis is a “structural analysis” of the transboundary
pollution problem itself. In his Golden Rules for Transboundary Pollution, Thomas Merrill
discusses what he calls certain “unique,” structural features of transboundary pollution that “may
account for the general failure to achieve effective collective action” to deal with it.186 For
example, Gulf hypoxia is a clear case of what Merrill calls unidirectional, transboundary
pollution, where the flow of pollution is one way: from upstream states to downstream waters.187
The reluctance of the “polluting states” to assist the “victim” jurisdictions downstream is
reinforced by the fact that the primary source states are many miles and jurisdictions upstream
from the affected waters.
On the other hand, the upstream states do have an interest in reducing nutrient pollution
for their own benefit, they just may not see any value added to participating in a regime that is
focused on attaining an outcome in distant downstream waters. The nutrient pollution that causes
Gulf hypoxia constitutes what Merrill calls “partial transboundary pollution.” 188 While the
degree of oxygen depletion in the downstream jurisdiction is particularly severe, significant
localized adverse impacts do occur within the source states as a result of the same pollutants that
cause Gulf hypoxia. In fact, the EPA concluded in 2002 that about 18% of America’s stream
miles and 22% of its lakes, reservoirs and ponds are impaired due to nutrient pollution, and the
186
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largest nutrient source states in the Mississippi River Basin are no exception. 189 The upstream
states are more likely to participate in a regulatory regime to reduce nutrient pollution if they
become convinced that participation would help them improve water quality at home.190
Another mode of analysis is the familiar “cost/benefit” model. Merrill analyses “the
conditions that give rise to regimes of collective action in the multijurisdictional environmental
context,”191 concluding that “the general criterion for determining when any type of collective
action regime will arise is that the benefits of the regime in terms of reducing externalities must
exceed the costs of creating and sustaining the regime.”192 Perhaps better than any other, this
relatively simple model explains why Gulf hypoxia is being addressed under a voluntary regime
at present. Both the “start up” and “maintenance” costs of a regulatory regime to address Gulf
hypoxia would be high.
Applying the structural and cost/benefit forms of analysis, the case of Gulf hypoxia may
be juxtaposed with hypoxia in New York’s Long Island Sound, where the problem is being
addressed through a regulatory regime implemented through a pollutant trading framework.193
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Gulf hypoxia is unlike Long Island Sound hypoxia in that: (1) the underlying hypoxia problems
are structurally different in that the sources of Gulf hypoxia are further removed from the
problems; (2) the costs of coordinating a regulatory regime involving thirty-one states would be
much higher; (3) the adverse impacts of Gulf hypoxia may be more uncertain; and, (4) the
majority of the nutrient pollution impairing Long Island Sound stems from point sources.194
A wild card in the cost/benefit analysis of the proposed regulatory regime for the Gulf of
Mexico is found in the extent of uncertainty regarding the level of reductions which may
reasonably be anticipated to occur as a result of currently existing regulatory programs. Existing
regulatory requirements upstream and upwind will arguably lead to reductions in loading with or
without another layer of regulation. For example, reductions of point sources should occur
through ongoing implementation of the Clean Water Act, including TMDL development and
implementation in upstream states. Also, regulation of pollutants such as nitrogen oxides under
the recently promulgated Clean Air Interstate Rule (CAIR) 195 will further decrease air deposition
of nitrogen. EPA estimates that CAIR will reduce nitrogen oxide emissions by 53%.196 Given
that atmospheric deposition accounts for an estimated fifteen to thirty percent of the nitrogen
loading in most U.S. estuaries, such reductions may significantly reduce Gulf hypoxia.197 These
factors argue in favor of the voluntary, wait-and-see approach.
On the other hand, the idea of an ocean bottom larger than the size of Massachusetts that
is unable to support fish and shellfish is troubling, and the possibility of rapid ecological collapse
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is sobering. Furthermore, reductions in nutrients to benefit the Gulf will also bring net benefits to
upstream state waters. While difficult or even impossible to quantify, these benefits could be
substantial, including more healthy ecosystems and improved public health.198 Strategies such as
wetlands protection and restoration also yield multiple benefits in the form of increasing
recharge of aquifers and reducing the severity and frequency of flooding impacts. Finally, a
pollution trading program could reduce the costs of implementing the required pollution control
reductions, making a regulatory regime more appealing under cost-benefit analysis from the
perspective of regulated entities. On the other hand, administration of such a trading program
will likely increase the EPA’s costs of creating and maintaining a regime.
Ultimately, the question of how to respond to Gulf hypoxia is, at best, only partially
answered by cost/benefit analysis. We must determine the level of risk that we are willing to take
in reducing the risk of catastrophic ecosystem collapse, as well as the level of ecosystem
degradation that we are willing to tolerate. If we view the risks to be acceptably low, or too
uncertain to form a basis for action, then the current regime of study and voluntary reductions is
appropriate. However, a risk-averse, precautionary approach is the more appropriate path given
the extent of human alteration of the Gulf of Mexico’s ecosystem, the uncertainty of the longterm consequences of hypoxia, the multiple benefits of solutions such as wetlands protection and
creation. Such a precautionary approach calls for an enforceable, regulatory regime to compel
action.
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IV. Recommendations
In conclusion, the threats to the Gulf of Mexico’s aquatic ecosystem imposed by hypoxia
are serious, and they demand more aggressive action to restore these waters in light of the risk of
ecosystem collapse. These actions should include the following:

1. Congress should amend the Clean Water Act in two ways. Congress should
adjust the jurisdictional lines in the Act to clarify the law and to make the law
consistent with general U.S. jurisdiction over marine waters. Ideally, all
references to the “contiguous zone” should be replaced with the term “exclusive
economic zone.” The term “territorial seas,” for the sake of clarity, should be
replaced with the term “state marine waters,” and should continue to apply to a
three-mile band of waters. Congress should then clearly delegate to the EPA the
duty to set water quality standards for all federal waters between the reach of
the state marine waters and the furthest extent of the EEZ by an appropriate
deadline. The ocean discharge criteria should be retained to provide an
additional layer of protection for state and federal waters. The term “oceans”
should be retained to provide the EPA with discretionary jurisdiction to regulate
discharges of pollution beyond the EEZ.
2. Congress should instruct the EPA to study a pollution trading program for the
Mississippi River basin and produce a report within a reasonable period of time.
At the time such a report is completed, Congress should consider whether to
mandate such a trading program, or leave the matter to resolution through the
exercise of EPA discretion.
3. Irregardless of Congressional action, EPA should develop federal “healthy
ocean waters” standards for exclusively federal waters under Sections 403 for
federal waters generally along the lines that the agency previously suggested..
Such section 403 standards, however, should retain the existing level of
protection provided within the “CWA 3-mile territorial seas,” as well as apply a
greater level of protection in federal waters extending from 3 to 200 miles from
shore. EPA should also clearly require upstream dischargers to not cause or
contribute to violation of these standards. Despite the lack of clarity in the law,
EPA should also cite to sections 304(a) and 303 as alternative sources of
authority.
4. EPA, LDEQ, and stakeholders should evaluate whether hypoxia occurs in
Louisiana jurisdictional waters. EPA should consider disapprovingthe State of
Louisiana’s 303(d) list and promulgate a federal list including Louisiana state
waters impaired due to Gulf hypoxia if such action is necessary and supported
by adequate information.

51

Brad McLane

Gulf Hypoxia

5. Louisiana should propose stronger water quality standards for nutrients, and
should also consider clarifying its dissolved oxygen criteria for marine waters,
ensuring that appropriate dissolved oxygen standards apply throughout the
water column. The EPA should review any resulting standards in consultation
with NMFS and USFWS to make certain that LDEQ nutrient standards are
protective of Gulf of Mexico waters.
6. The EPA should review water quality standards state by state for upstream
states as each state conducts its triennial reviews. EPA should consult with
NMFS in the process of reviewing these standards as required by the ESA and
SFA. EPA should disapprove any state water quality standards that fail to
include adequate nutrient water quality standards, and promulgate federal
nutrient water quality standards to address these waters as appropriate.
7. EPA should immediately commence development of twointerstate TMDL s for
the Gulf of Mexico for the parameters of nitrogen and phosphorus, considering
an enforceable pollution-trading framework as one option for their
implementation.
8. Finally, research and monitoring of Gulf hypoxia should be adequately funded.
Because of the lack of clarity regarding the actual and potential ecological and
fishery impacts of the continuing annual cycle of hypoxia in the Gulf of
Mexico, sufficient funding for research is critical.
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